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Abstract. User authentication based on biometrics is getting an in-
creasing attention. However, privacy concerns for biometric data have
impeded the adoption of cloud-based services for biometric authentica-
tion. This paper proposes an efficient distributed two-factor authenti-
cation protocol that is privacy-preserving even in the presence of col-
luding internal adversaries. One of the authentication factors in our
protocol is biometrics, and the other factor can be either knowledge-
based or possession-based. The actors involved in our protocol are users,
user/client devices with biometric sensors, service provider, and cloud for
storing protected biometric templates. Contrary to the existing biometric
authentication protocols that offer security only in the honest-but-curious
adversarial model, our protocol provides enhanced security and privacy
properties in the active (or malicious) adversarial model. Specifically,
our protocol offers identity privacy, unlinkability, and user data (i.e., the
biometric template data and the second factor) privacy against compro-
mised cloud storage service, and preserves the privacy of the user data
even if the cloud storage service colludes with the service provider. More-
over, our protocol only employs lightweight schemes and thus is efficient.
The distributed model combined with the security and privacy proper-
ties of our protocol paves the way towards a new cloud-based business
model for privacy-preserving authentication.
Key words: Biometrics, security, privacy, privacy-preserving authenti-
cation.
1 Introduction
As biometric authentication is becoming more popular and ubiquitous,
protecting and ensuring the privacy of biometric templates is of utmost
importance. Biometrics poses a serious threat to user privacy. Not only
does it reveal sensitive information about users such as medical condition,
race and ethnicity, but it can also be used for mass surveillance. A number
of privacy-preserving authentication protocols involving biometrics have
been proposed over the last decade. Most of them, however, are designed
to be secure in the honest-but-curious (HBC) adversarial model. In this
2 Aysajan Abidin, Enrique Argones Ru´a, Bart Preneel
work, we go beyond the HBC model and propose an efficient privacy-
preserving biometric authentication protocol with enhanced security and
privacy properties in the malicious adversary model. Our protocol also
utilises an additional short secret, e.g., a password, as a second factor.
Privacy of users is protected from two different threats: disclosure of
privacy-sensitive data (i.e., biometric templates and other secrets) and
disclosure of behavioural information (i.e., user’s identity when using an
online service) to malicious internal adversaries. We employ a distributed
model for the protocol participants and categorise them as the user, the
client device (i.e., sensor), the service provider, and the cloud storage.
A brief overview of the protocol. It consists of a set of N pě 1q users
U, a set of N sensors S (one for each user), a service provider SP, and
a cloud storage provider which we just call database DB throughout the
paper. During the enrolment phase, the sensor Si obtains from a user Ui a
biometric reference template bi, a password pwi (for simplicity, we regard
the second factor as a password, but any knowledge-based or possession-
based factor could be used instead) and an identity IDi. It then derives a
random bitstring ri of the same length as bi from pwi and IDi using a key
derivation function KDF [1] (i.e., ri Ð KDFppwi, IDiq), computes bi ‘ ri,
and sends pIDi, bi ‘ riq to the service provider SP. Since we are using a
combination (i.e., XOR) of factors, this has to be taken into consideration
when choosing security parameters for these factors (cf. Sect. 3.1). SP then
maps the IDi to an index i (i.e., i Ð IDi) using a procedure known only
to itself and forwards pi, bi‘ riq to the database DB for storage. SP itself
stores pi, IDiq.
During the authentication phase, a user Ui authenticates himself to
the service provider as follows. The sensor Si obtains a fresh biometric
template b1i, the user password pwi and an identity IDi from the user. Si
then generates ri using the same procedure as in the enrolment phase,
computes b1i ‘ ri, and sends pIDi, b1i ‘ riq to SP. The service provider
SP retrieves i corresponding to IDi from its own storage and retrieves
bi‘ ri from DB by employing a private information retrieval PIR scheme.
This scheme allows SP to retrieve bi ‘ ri from DB without revealing to
DB the value of the retrieved information (under information-theoretic or
computational security assumptions, cf. Sect. 3). SP then XORs bi‘ri and
b1i‘ri to get bi‘b1i, and grants the user Ui access (or simply authenticates
the user) if the Hamming weight HWpbi‘ b1iq ď τ , where τ is a predefined
authentication threshold. Note that HWpbi ‘ b1iq “ HDpbi, b1iq, where HD
is the Hamming distance.
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This two-factor authentication protocol employs a combination of a
private information retrieval scheme and a key derivation function to
achieve strong privacy. It preserves the privacy of the biometric templates,
password and password-derived key against malicious and colluding ser-
vice provider and database; and also offers identity privacy and unlinka-
bility against malicious database, due to the database anonymisation and
the use of a PIR during authentication.
Applications. Cloud computing provides an interesting set of advan-
tages, such as increased availability and flexibility, reduced risks related
to data losses, and reduced costs in terms of technology infrastructure.
Due to privacy concerns, however, the adoption of cloud-based services
for biometric authentication has been delayed. Our new protocol enables
a new secure and privacy-preserving authentication cloud service busi-
ness model. Services provided by the Database actor in our protocol can
be securely transferred to a cloud-based service. This cloud-based Pro-
tected Biometrics Database service can scalably provide secure and pri-
vate storage and retrieval of user’s authentication data to different Service
Providers.
Remarks. Some design decisions in our system must be explained in
more depth, to make clear that they are realistic and fully justified.
First, we choose to work with biometric binary templates instead of
other alternative representations based on integers or real numbers. This
is justified by the existence of many biometrics based on binary templates,
e.g. iris patterns are represented by IrisCodes [2]; or where a binary repre-
sentation can be derived, e.g. even behavioural biometrics such as online
signatures can be represented in binary templates [3]. Furthermore, binary
templates can be compared using the Hamming distance, which is very
convenient for simple and well-known homomorphic encryption schemes,
thus avoiding the need for a specific design of a new cryptosystem. Using
other representations requires using much more complex crypto schemes,
e.g. computing the Euclidean distance requires a fully homomorphic en-
cryption or coupling additive homomorphic encryption scheme with an
oblivious transfer or garbled circuits.
Second, we combine several factors. This may influence usability, since
the processes for using the system in both enrollment and verification will
take longer and the users will experience usability issues related to both
authentication factors. However, the combination of several authentica-
tion factors, as demonstrated in this paper, minimizes the risks associated
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with the use of each of the authentication factors. Specifically, the security
of the system is significantly increased, making attacks much more diffi-
cult to the typical adversaries, and the privacy concerns posed by the use
of biometrics are minimized by using the additional authentication factor
for binding the binary biometric information. The proposed solution is
simple yet effective.
Related work. Privacy-preserving biometric authentication has attracted
a considerable amount of research over the last decade. Many of the ex-
isting privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocols are based on
secure multi-party computation techniques including oblivious transfer [4,
5] and homomorphic encryption [6, 7], as well as on private information
retrieval [8, 9]. For example, Bringer et al. [10] proposed a protocol using
the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [7]. This protocol by Bringer et al.
and the subsequent protocols by Barbosa et al. [11] and Stoianov [12] all
use a distributed entity model. However, all of the these protocols are
designed to achieve security in the HBC model, and their security is also
critcized [11, 13–16]. To the best of our knowledge, most (if not all) of the
protocols using biometrics as single authentication factor presented in
the literature are at best secure against HBC adversaries only. Recently,
Abidin et al. [17] describe a simple attack on the Bringer et al. [10] pro-
tocol and proposes an improvement to achieve security against malicious
but not colluding insider adversaries, utilizing additional secret keys. As
in the original Bringer et al. protocol, Abidin et al. protocol also stores
the reference biometric templates in the clear.
There have been other works combining biometrics with other au-
thentication factors, such as knowledge-based (e.g., passwords) and/or
possession-based (e.g., tokens). This multi-factor approach involving bio-
metrics has been a popular approach to remote biometric authentication
[18]. For example, in [19] a scheme combining biometrics with a password
and a smart card was proposed by Lee et al.. Weaknesses of this scheme
were identified subsequently in [20], where the authors also propose a flex-
ible remote authentication scheme based on fingerprints and ElGammal
cryptosystem. However, this latter scheme was vulnerable to, among oth-
ers, spoofing attacks as identified by Khan and Zhang [21]. More efficient
schemes were also proposed in [22, 23, 18] in the past couple of years,
although some of them turned out to have security weaknesses [24]. A
common feature among these schemes is that they use smart cards to
store authentication information. Hence a drawback of these schemes is
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that if the smart card is stolen or lost, then either the security is at risk
or the user can no longer authenticate himself.
Outline. After giving the necessary background material and our threat
model in Sect. 2, we give a detailed presentation of our protocol, pay-
ing particular attention to the key derivation function and the private
information retrieval scheme in Sect. 3. Next, we analyse its privacy and
security in Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5 summarises the paper.
2 Background and threat model
This section presents the necessary background material and the security
requirements for the cryptographic primitives used in our protocol.
Definition 1. A function negl : N ÞÑ r0, 1s is said to be negligible if for
all positive polynomials poly and all sufficiently large λ P N, we have
neglpλq ă 1{polypλq.
2.1 Security and privacy definitions
Definition 2. Let Π be a two-factor authentication protocol. Then Π is
secure if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A can suc-
cessfully authenticate itself to the verifier as the legitimate user it im-
personates, even when given all protocol transcripts and all inputs of the
verifier and all provers (i.e., users) with the exception of at least one
authentication factor of the user it tries to impersonate.
Regarding privacy, we consider unlinkability, identity privacy and user
data privacy. Let Π be as before in all of the following definitions.
Unlinkability. Intuitively, if the adversary cannot distinguish a user who
is authenticating himself from a user who is not, then unlinkability holds.
Therefore, we define unlinkability as follows.
Definition 3. Suppose that any two distinct users Ui0 and Ui1, where
i0, i1 ě 1, are given and that Uiβ , β P t0, 1u, makes an authentication
attempt. Then, Π has unlinkability, if any PPT adversary A cannot guess
β, except with a negligible advantage. Here, the adversary’s advantage is
defined as
ˇˇ
Prtβ “ β1u ´ 1{2ˇˇ, where β1 is the adversary’s guess.
Identity privacy. If the adversary cannot tell to which ID a given au-
thentication credential belongs, then we say that the identity privacy is
preserved. Formally, this is defined as follows.
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Definition 4. Suppose that any identity IDi and two credentials ci0 “
bi0 ‘ ri0 and ci1 “ bi1 ‘ ri1, where i0, i1 ě 1 and ciβ , β P t0, 1u, belongs
to IDi, are given. Then, Π preserves the identity privacy, if any PPT
adversary A cannot guess β, except with a negligible advantage. Here
again, the adversary’s advantage is defined as
ˇˇ
Prtβ “ β1u ´ 1{2ˇˇ, where
β1 is the adversary’s guess.
User data privacy. If the adversary cannot learn anything about the
sensitive user data (i.e., biometric data and the second authentication
factor), then we say that the user data privacy is preserved.
Definition 5. We say that Π preserves the privacy of the user data, i.e.,
the biometric templates (both fresh and reference), the password and/or
the password-derived key, if no PPT adversary A can gain more infor-
mation on the user data than what is allowed by the protocol transcripts,
except with a negligible probability.
2.2 Key derivation function
A key derivation function (KDF) is a (deterministic) function that can
be used to derive keys for cryptographic applications using a secret input
data, such as passwords. We require that the KDF satisfies the following
security definition [1].
Definition 6. A key derivation function KDF is said to be secure with
respect to a source of input with sufficient min-entropy γ if no probabilis-
tic polynomial time (PPT) attacker A can distinguish its output from a
random output of equal length, except with a negligible probability neglpγq.
2.3 Private information retrieval
A PIR scheme allows a user to retrieve a value from a database without
revealing to the database which value is retrieved. For example, using
a PIR scheme a user can retrieve the i-th bit (or the i-th block) from
a database of N -bits (or a database of N blocks) without revealing the
value of i to the database. We require that the PIR scheme satisfies the
following definition.
Definition 7. Suppose that the database contains an N data blocks with
blocklength ` bits each, with both N, ` ě 1 (i.e., the database contains
x1x2 ¨ ¨ ¨xN , where the length of xi is `, for i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N .) And let PIR be
the private information retrieval scheme employed to retrieve the i-th
block from the database (i.e., xi Ð PIRpiq). Then the database should
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not have any information about the value of i and xi. If the database is
assumed to be computationally unbounded, the PIR is called information-
theoretic PIR; otherwise, it is called computational PIR.
2.4 Threat model
In the typical security analysis, adversaries are divided into two main
categories: (i) honest-but-curious (HBC) adversaries, and (ii) malicious
adversaries. In the HBC adversarial model, corrupted parties follow the
protocol specification. However, the adversary may obtain the internal
state of all corrupted parties (i.e., transcript of all received messages)
and may attempt to use this information to recover sensitive data (e.g.,
biometric templates) that should remain private. In the malicious ad-
versarial model, the corrupted parties may arbitrarily deviate from the
protocol specification in order to break the security and privacy of the
protected data. Since external adversaries cannot obtain more informa-
tion than the internal ones, we consider exclusively malicious internal
adversaries that may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification.
To be privacy-preserving, a biometric authentication protocol should
satisfy not only the security requirement (cf. Def. 2), but also the following
privacy requirements:
1. Biometric reference privacy: An adversary A should not be able to recover the
stored reference biometric template (cf. Def. 5).
2. Biometric sample privacy: A should not be able to recover the fresh biometric
sample (cf. Def. 5).
3. Password privacy: A should not be able to recover the password or the key
derived from the password (cf. Def. 5).
4. Identity privacy: A should not be able to link a database entry to a user identity
ID. Note that the protocol does not require ID to be personally identifiable infor-
mation, and so this privacy requirement only concerns whether a database entry
is associated to a specific user ID employed in the protocol (cf. Def. 4).
5. Unlinkability: A should not be able to link an authentication attempt to a user
(cf. Def. 3).
In this paper, we only consider adversaries that attempt to violate these
privacy requirements and skip denial-of-service type of attacks.
Depending on the attack scenario (i.e., depending on which protocol
entity is compromised or malicious), the privacy requirements change
accordingly. For instance, the service provider SP always knows which
user is authenticating himself so the unlinkability and identity privacy
are not relevant, although the latter can be achieved using anonymous
IDs. Therefore, whenever the SP is compromised, either colluding or not
colluding with the DB, we only focus on the biometric samples and the
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password (or password-derived key) secrecy. On the other hand, if the
attacker is the database DB all of the requirements must hold.
The Sensor is trusted, i.e. it does not deviate the protocol, it does
not store ID or biometric samples, and the information it handles during
the enrollment and verification phases is discarded and only accessible
to the legitimate application at run time; and we are not considering
the case where it is compromised, e.g. infected by malicious software.
We assume that each user has a client device (e.g., a smartphone) with
a biometric sensor. It is quite common nowadays that people use their
smartphones to do even bank transactions. This does not make the user
devices trustworthy, but if the users cannot trust the devices used to log
in, a secure access to their remote services cannot be accomplished.
A further assumption we make is that the communication among the
protocol entities takes place over a secure channel. This means that an
adversary cannot intercept or modify a message in transit. Lastly, we re-
quire that before any user authenticates himself to the service provider,
the service provider authenticates itself to the client device (i.e., the sen-
sor). This can be achieved by using secure transmission protocols, e.g.
TLS or IPsec. Hence, at the conclusion of the protocol there should be a
mutual entity authentication, where the service provider is authenticated
first and then the user authenticates himself to the service provider. This
is to preclude phishing attacks, i.e. to ensure that the user does not blindly
give away his identity and authentication data to attackers. The authen-
tication mechanism for the server and the way it is coupled to the user
authentication is left outside the scope of this paper.
3 The protocol
The protocol comprises a set S of N sensors, one for each user in a set U of
N users, a service provider SP, and a database DB. Each user is assumed
to have a client device (e.g., a smartphone), which has a biometric sensor.
Enrolment. The enrolment works as follows. The sensor Si prompts
the user Ui, for i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N , for his biometrics and password pwi, and
outputs bi ‘ ri, where bi is a (binary) reference biometric template of
bitlength ` extracted by the sensor from the user provided biometrics
and ri Ð KDFppwi, IDiq is also of bitlength `. Then, Si sends pIDi, bi‘ riq
to the service provider SP, that first maps the IDi to a unique index i and
locally stores pi, IDiq, and forwards pi, bi ‘ riq to DB for storage.
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The service provider does not need to store pi, IDiq. Instead, what
SP needs is a deterministic one-to-one map to map IDi to an index i.
For the sake of simplicity, however, we assume that SP locally stores the
pair pi, IDiq, and that during authentication it just retrieves the index i
corresponding to a received IDi from its local storage.
User authentication. A user Ui authenticates himself to the service
provider as follows. After authenticating the service provider, the sensor
Si prompts the user for his data: fresh biometrics, password and identity.
Then, the sensor extracts a fresh biometric template b1i from the user
provided biometrics, receives the user password pwi and identity IDi from
the user Ui. Subsequently, Si derives ri using the key derivation function
KDF with pwi and IDi as input, computes b
1
i ‘ ri, and sends pIDi, b1i ‘
riq to the service provider SP. SP first obtains i corresponding to IDi
from its own local storage and retrieves bi ‘ ri from DB by employing a
private information retrieval PIR scheme (see Sect. 3.1 on PIR for details).
SP then XORs bi ‘ ri and b1i ‘ ri to obtain bi ‘ b1i. Finally, the user is
authenticated if the Hamming weight HWpbi‘b1iq ď τ ; rejected, otherwise.
Note that the sensors Si, i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N , do not store any user infor-
mation (i.e., biometric template data and/or password), thus user’s data
privacy is still preserved if his terminal is stolen or lost. When a user
Ui presents his biometrics to the sensor Si, it only outputs the XOR of
the extracted biometric template with the derived key ri, i.e., b
1
i ‘ ri or
bi ‘ ri depending on the protocol phase, and never outputs the biomet-
ric template data or the password-derived key ri in the clear or stores
them. Also, the ri’s are generated at run time using the password pwi
and user IDi as input to a KDF, and ri and pwi are erased from memory
immediately after use.
To highlight the feasibility of our protocol, below we elaborate further
on the KDF and the PIR scheme that can be employed in our protocol.
However, since we would like to keep it as generic as possible, we leave
the choice for specific KDF and PIR schemes for the users of our protocol.
3.1 KDF
In our protocol, both the reference bi and fresh b
1
i biometric templates
are bound (i.e., XORed) with keys ri generated from the second authenti-
cation factor (e.g., password) using a KDF. KDF is a useful tool in cryp-
tography and often used in diverse applications to derive cryptographic
keys from a secret input. According to PKCS # 5 [25], for a password-
based KDF, it is recommended to salt the password in order to prevent
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dictionary attacks and to compute the hash many times to slow down
the KDF process, which is also known as key-stretching [26]. If password
is used as the second factor in our protocol, then the salt needs to be
stored in the user device. We refer the interested reader to Yao et al. [27]
for a formal treatment of password-based KDF, and to Krawczyk [1] for a
more general treatment and rigorous security definitions of KDF. What is
important to note when choosing a specific KDF for our protocol is that
the chosen KDF must be secure according to our Def. 6.
Regarding the security requirements on the inputs to the KDF, we
note that the password should have at least the same min-entropy as
the one required for the output. Since only the XOR of the KDF output
with the biometric template is stored, the security requirement should be
referred to this combination (i.e., ri ‘ bi), whose min-entropy is greater
than or equal to maxtH8priq, H8pbiqu, where H8 stands for min-entropy.
Therefore, as long as one of the factors provides sufficient min-entropy,
the entropy requirement on the other can be relaxed if the security is
our only concern. However, the min-entropy of the second authentication
factor impacts privacy. The min-entropy of the second factor should be
greater than or equal to the entropy of the biometric template for avoiding
biometric information leakage to internal adversaries.
3.2 PIR
As mentioned briefly in Sect. 2, PIR schemes allow for the retrieval of the
content of a database entry, say the i-th bit of an N -bit database, without
revealing to the database which content or entry is retrieved (i.e., the value
of i in the example). Chor et al. [8] were the first to introduce the notion
of PIR, and they studied information-theoretically secure PIRs in the case
of single database or multiple non-communicating databases. Since then,
there has been a substantial amount of work on PIR; we present here a
quick review of the work relevant to our protocol.
Recall that we assume that there is a single database. In practice,
however, one can use multiple databases (e.g., multiple cloud storage
providers) storing the same information. This is more robust, because
even if some databases are down, e.g., due to power outage, users can
still authenticate themselves to the service provider. So, we divide our
discussions on PIRinto single database PIR and multiple database PIR.
Single DB PIR. Since Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [28] proposed the first
single DB PIR scheme, the field has evolved and important connections be-
tween single DB PIR and other cryptographic primitives, such as oblivious
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transfer and collision resistant hashing, have been identified [29]. Ostro-
vsky and Skeith give a nice survey on single DB PIR schemes in [29].
Here we describe a simple scheme that appeared in [10],which utilises the
Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [7], a bit-wise encryption scheme with an
homomorphic property: EncpmqEncpm1q “ Encpm‘m1q, where m and m1
are two message bits. Suppose that the SP wants to retrieve the i-th user’s
data item bi ‘ ri from the DB. Also suppose that SP generates a private
and public key pair psk, pkq for the Goldwasser-Micali encryption schemes,
and gives the public key pk to the database and keeps the secret key sk to
itself. Assume from now on that the content of the DB is an N ˆ ` binary
matrix A. Then, SP forms PIRpiq as follows: for j “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N , sj “ 1, if
j “ i, 0 otherwise. It sends Encpsq “ `Encps1q, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,EncpsN q˘ to the DB,







˘ “ Enc`bi,n ‘ ri,n˘, and returns Ci “ pCi,1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Ci,`q to SP.
Note that Encp0q is used to randomise the response in order to resist
an attack similar to the one described by Barbosa et al. [11]. Finally,
SP decrypts Ci to obtain bi‘ ri. This scheme has a communication com-
plexity of OpNc ` `cq, where c is the ciphertext length, which needs to
be at least 2048 bits for 112-bit security. Furthermore, this PIR scheme is
computationally secure according to our Def. 7, if the Goldwasser-Micali
encryption is IND-CPA secure [10].
Multiple DB PIR. When there are k pě 1q copies of pi, bi ‘ riq, for
i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , N , stored in k DBs, we can use the following information-
theoretic PIR scheme in our protocol. Suppose that there are 2 DBs and
that the SP wants to retrieve i entry, which is bi‘ri, from the DBs. Then,
the PIR scheme works as follows:
– The SP prepares the queries as follows:
‚ generate at random a bitstring s of length N .
‚ flip the i-th bit of s; let us denote the resulting bitstring by s1.
‚ send s to DB1, and s1 to DB2.
– DB1 returns t “ sA mod 2, where s is used as a row vector, to SP.
– DB2 returns t1 “ s1A mod 2, where s1 is used as a row vector, to SP.
– Finally, SP computes t ‘ t1 “ sA ‘ s1A “ ps ‘ s1qA “ bi ‘ ri. Note that s ‘ s1 is
all 0s except at the i-th position, where it has a 1.
Obviously, this 2-DB PIR scheme has a communication complexity of
OpN ` `q. And the computation performed by the DBs is just the XOR of
the rows (of A) corresponding to the components of s (or s1) that are 1. We
note that this scheme, or for that matter most k-DB PIR schemes, assumes
that the DBs are trusted not to collude with each other; otherwise, the
DBs can learn the value of i. There are, however, also k-DB PIR schemes
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that remain secure even if all databases collude with each other [30]. We
refer to the excellent survey by Gasarch [31] for more on multiple DB PIR.
4 Security and privacy analysis
We assume that the protocol setup and enrolment phases are done se-
curely and all involved entities behaved honestly in these phases. There-
fore, we focus on the authentication phase in our analysis. We distinguish
the following attack scenarios from each other.
1. Attacker = The service provider SP: Its objective is to learn the user biometric
template or the user password. It has access to b1i‘ ri and bi‘ ri, and b1i‘ bi. The
identity privacy and unlinkability, however, are not relevant if SP is compromised,
as it knows the user IDs.
2. Attacker = The database DB: Its objectives are to learn (a) user identity, (b)
biometric templates, (c) passwords or password-derived keys, and (d) link different
authentication attempts. It knows only bi‘ ri, but it does not know to which user
it belongs, since the database is anonymised. Also, since a secure PIR is employed
during authentication, the identity privacy and unlinkability requirements are also
satisfied. So all of the privacy requirements are satisfied in this case.
3. Attacker = SP+DB: Their objective is to learn the user biometric template or the
user password. In this case, they know bi ‘ ri, b1i ‘ ri, and bi ‘ b1i, as in the case
of the attacker being SP. Therefore, against the collusion between SP and DB, the
biometric template (both reference and sample) privacy and the password (or the
password-derived key ri) privacy are preserved.
4. Attacker = The sensor Si: we only consider the case where Si is used by a ma-
licious user to impersonate its legitimate owner. Since the sensor does not store
any information about its legitimate user’s biometrics and password, the attacker
cannot learn anything or impersonate the user.
We now state the security and privacy properties of our protocol. The
proofs are presented in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Our proposed protocol is secure according to our Def. 2, if
the employed KDF and PIR are secure according to Def. 6 and 7, respec-
tively, and iÐ IDi procedure is known only to the SP.
Unlinkability against malicious DB. Recall that if the adversary can-
not distinguish a user who is authenticating himself from a user who is
not, then unlinkability holds. Therefore, we state the unlinkability result
against malicious DB as follows.
Theorem 2. Our proposed protocol has unlinkability against malicious
DB according to Def. 3, if the employed PIR is secure according to Def. 7.
Identity privacy against malicious DB. If the DB cannot tell to which
ID a database entry belongs, then we say that the identity privacy is
preserved. This is summarised in the next theorem.
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Theorem 3. Our proposed protocol has identity privacy against mali-
cious DB according to Def. 4, if the employed PIR is secure according to
Def. 7 and iÐ IDi procedure is known only to the SP.
User data privacy against malicious SP+DB. Our last result re-
lates to the privacy of user data, i.e., the fresh and reference biometric
templates, password and password-derived key. Note that when we say
that the password has sufficient min-entropy, the word “password” is used
just as a reference to the second authentication factor which is given as
an input to the KDF. The following theorem states that as long as the
KDF is secure, the privacy of the user data is preserved against malicious
and colluding SP and DB.
Theorem 4. Our protocol preserves the privacy of the user data (i.e., the
fresh and reference biometric templates, password and password-derived
key) against malicious SP+DB according to Def. 5, if the employed KDF is
secure according to Def. 6 and the password has sufficient min-entropy.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a two-factor privacy-preserving authentication
protocol that is secure against malicious and possibly colluding adver-
saries. The second factor (e.g., password) adds another layer of security
in that even if an attacker successfully forges a user biometrics (e.g., a
fingerprint), he/she cannot impersonate the user without knowing the
password. Furthermore, as our analysis shows, the privacy of the users’
identities, their passwords and biometric template data is preserved even
if the protocol actors are compromised. The protocol is efficient and em-
ploys a distributed model for the protocol actors and thus suitable for
applications where users authenticate themselves to a service provider us-
ing their smart devices that have embedded biometric sensors and where
part of the user data (i.e., the encrypted biometric reference template)
are outsourced to cloud storage providers. Hence, our protocol paves the
way towards a secure and privacy-preserving authentication cloud service
business model. In this model, services provided by the Database in our
protocol can be securely transferred to one or several cloud-based services.
Such cloud storage services can provide a secure and private storage and
retrieval of user’s authentication data to different Service Providers.
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A Proofs
Proof (of Theorem 1). The proof is split into two cases. In the first case,
the adversary A is given a valid password (e.g., A is given pwi of user Ui).
In the second case, A is given a valid biometrics, (e.g., A is given b1i of
user Ui). In both cases, if A can provide b1i‘ri such that HWpbi‘b1iq ď τ ,
then A succeeds in impersonating the user Ui.
Case 1: Assume that the attacker can successfully impersonate a user
with a non-negligible probability . This means that A either (a) can forge
the user biometrics and generate b1i that matches the reference template
bi of the user Ui, or (b) knows i Ð IDi so that it can collude with DB
to learn bi. However, the probability of case (a) happening is bounded by
the false acceptance rate, which can be bounded to be arbitrarily small,
at the price of increased false rejection rate. And case (b) requires that A
can learn i from PIRpiq or can derive i from IDi, which contradicts both
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the security of the PIR scheme and the fact that iÐ IDi is only known to
SP. Therefore, A cannot impersonate a user knowing only the password.
Case 2: Assume again that the attacker can successfully impersonate a
user with a non-negligible probability. As in Case 1, this means that A
either can guess the password (or the password-generated key ri) or knows
i Ð IDi so that it can collude with DB to learn ri. However, while the
probability of the former is negligible in H8ppwq, the latter requires that
A can learn i from PIRpiq or knows iÐ IDi.
Therefore, A cannot successfully impersonate any user without having
access to both authentication factors. Note that the use of salt prevents
the adversary from practical dictionary attacks. Hence, it is important to
salt the KDF, e.g. with the user ID, so that the security of the protocol
in Case 2 can be related to H8ppwq.
Proof (of Theorem 2). Suppose that the adversary (i.e., the malicious
DB) has a non-negligible advantage, i.e.,
ˇˇ
Prtβ “ β1u ´ 1{2ˇˇ ě neglpλq,
where λ is a chosen security parameter for the protocol. Then, that means
DB can guess the value of β (or iβ) from PIRpiβq with a non-negligible
probability. This in turn implies that DB can break the security of the un-
derlying PIR scheme with a non-negligible probability, which contradicts
the assumption that PIR is secure according to Def. 7. ˝
Proof (of Theorem 3). Suppose that the adversary can distinguish pIDi0 , ci0q
from pIDi0 , ci1q. Then the adversary can infer from PIRpi0q (and the re-
sponse to the query) the value of i0, or infer from IDi0 the value of i0.
This contradicts the security assumptions on the PIR, or the secrecy as-
sumption on the correspondence between IDi0 and i0, respectively. ˝
Proof (of Theorem 4). Since the adversary (i.e., malicious SP+DB) has
access to bi ‘ ri, b1i ‘ ri and bi ‘ b1i only, for all i P r1, N s, it cannot learn
more than what can already be learnt from these about bi, b
1
i and ri (or
the password from which the ri is generated), as long as the KDF is secure
and the password has sufficient min-entropy. The adversary can attempt
to guess the value of bi, b
1
i or ri at random using what the information at
its disposal, but in order to verify whether the guess is correct, it needs
access to an oracle that can answer whether the guessed values are correct.
If the KDF is secure and the second factor has sufficient min-entropy, the
expected number of queries needed to finally get an affirmative answer
from such oracle is exponential in the min-entropy of ri. ˝
